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Managing (Un)certainty in the
Japanese antique art trade  how
economic and social factors shape a
market
HARALD CONRAD
Abstract: Market actors are commonly faced with solving three distinct
coordination problems as sources of uncertainty. How should they value the
objects of their trade? How can they shield themselves from the competition?
And with whom and how do they cooperate? This article investigates how
Japanese antique art dealers confront these issues. While offering a rich
description and analysis of a hitherto understudied Japanese market, the article
shows how economic and social issues are closely intertwined. It contributes to
our understanding of behaviour in a Japanese market in three ways. First, it
underscores how inclusion/exclusion, status, reputation, networks and
hierarchies constitute a field that allows market exchanges to exist in the first
place, while also channelling, and being impacted upon by these market
exchanges. Secondly, contrary to neoclassical economic theory, where the idea
of value has largely been abandoned, the findings highlight the importance of
distinguishing between notions of value and price in the understanding of
markets. Thirdly, the article shows how market actors actively shape market
arrangements to address the specific challenges of their domain. In the case of
the Japanese antique art market these challenges include high risks of fakes, a
limited quantity of high quality material, market outsiders, and dealers with
deep pockets.
Keywords: valuations, pricing, auction, lottery, social organization, Japan,
economic sociology, antique art
Introduction
In a paper on Tokyo’s Tsukiji fish market, Theodore C. Bestor (1992, p. 1)
remarked that ‘(p)robably the economic system of no society is subject to as
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much scrutiny, analysis, and sheer speculation regarding its “special character”
as is Japan’s.’ Bestor argued that underlying this interest in Japan’s economy was
the implicit or explicit assumption that social patterns and cultural values condi-
tion economic systems. This article will not argue that there is something particu-
larly ‘special’ about the Japanese antique art trade, in the sense that some of the
described structures and practices could not or never be found in other countries,
even though some of the described auction practices appear indeed to be unique
and have, to the best of the author’s knowledge, never been discussed in the
world’s auction literature. Instead, the article highlights the important role that
social factors such as inclusion/exclusion, status, reputation, networks and hierar-
chies have played in shaping the structure and practices of the antique art trade in
Japan. The theoretical lens through which this market is examined in this article
is shaped by recent contributions to economic sociology literature, a subfield of
sociology that aims to conceptually unify social, cultural and economic perspec-
tives in the study of economic phenomena (Smelser and Swedberg 2005, p. 3).
While offering a detailed description and analysis of a hitherto understudied Jap-
anese market, the article demonstrates through rich empirical evidence how eco-
nomic and social issues are closely intertwined. In particular, it contributes to
our understanding of behaviour in a Japanese market in three ways. First, the
findings underscore how inclusion/exclusion, status, reputation, networks and
hierarchies constitute a field that allows market exchanges to exist in the first
place, while also channelling, and being impacted upon by these market
exchanges. Secondly, contrary to neoclassical economic theory, where the idea of
value has largely been abandoned, the findings highlight the importance of distin-
guishing between notions of value and price in the understanding of markets.
Thirdly, the article explores in detail how market actors actively shape market
arrangements to address the specific challenges of their domain. In the case of
the Japanese antique art market these challenges include the high risk of fakes, a
limited quantity of high quality material, market outsiders, and dealers with deep
pockets. To examine these issues, the article proceeds as follows. The next sec-
tion elaborates on the theoretical framework of this article and takes account of
some Japan-related literature. This is followed in the third section by a short dis-
cussion of methodological and research ethics issues. At the heart of the article,
the findings section analyses and discusses in detail the social order of the Japa-
nese antique art market. The article finishes with a short summary and discussion
of how the findings relate to other Japanese markets.
Ways to look at markets
Following an economic sociological perspective, the purpose of this paper is to
shed light on the workings of the Japanese antique art trade, a topic on which
there exists currently close to no English or Japanese academic literature. Before
reviewing the few sources that do refer to this Japanese market, this section will
first set out the theoretical framework of this article.
2 Managing (Un)certainty in the Japanese antique art trade
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Despite significant progress of sociologists to understand the origins, workings,
and dynamics of markets as social structures in recent years, a theoretical consen-
sus that would bring together the different perspectives has yet to emerge. Flig-
stein and Dauter (2007, pp. 106107) identify three major theoretical
approaches according to whether researchers focus on (a) networks, (b) institu-
tions or (c) performativity as explanatory mechanisms in the emergence and
dynamics of markets. While network scholars focus on relational ties between
actors as sources of social structure, institutionalists ‘focus on how cognition and
action are contextualized by market rules, power, and norms. The performative
school of thought views economic action as a result of calculative processes
involving the specific technologies and artifacts that actors employ’ (Fligstein
and Dauter 2007, p. 107). Despite these different approaches in the literature,
all mainstream economic sociologists view markets as social arenas where the
connectedness of social actors affects their behaviour and where actors are not
simply calculating their actions according to rational or economic criteria. Inclu-
sion/exclusion, status, reputation, networks and hierarchies constitute the social
order that allow market exchanges to exist in the first place, while also shaping,
challenging, and being impacted by these market arrangements.
In this article we focus on the recent theoretical contributions from Beckert
and Aspers (Beckert 2009; Beckert 2011; Aspers and Beckert 2011). Although
their approach might be criticized for being somewhat ‘flat’ sociologically, as
social aspects appear to come in only after being bent through the prism of the
market, it allows a focus on three distinct coordination problems as sources of
uncertainty that market actors need to address. These were the focus of our
empirical investigation (Beckert 2011): valuation, competition, and cooperation. In
any given market, participants are faced with the uncertainty of assessing the
value of commodities (meaning the regard that something is held to deserve).
Demand can constitute itself only when the potential purchasers can distinguish
between the values of goods and the sellers can reliably demonstrate these values.
The assignment of value to goods and the development of preferences are a com-
plex affair and particularly difficult in markets such as the art market, where
objective criteria, like technical standards do not exist (Velthuis 2003). In such
markets the value of products depends upon symbolic assignments of value that
must be constructed by market participants (Velthuis 2011). In economics, mar-
ginal utility theory considers preferences, as expressed in the market place, as
exogenously given. Moreover, it abandons the notion of value to focus exclusively
on prices, which are considered to be an outcome of supply and demand. How-
ever, Aspers and Beckert (2011) argue convincingly that a full understanding of
markets requires a distinction between value and prices. Whether prices are con-
sidered high or low can only be judged with some notion of value, which is inde-
pendent of price.
Competition is a paradox for markets. While it is a constitutive element of any
market, it also limits profit expectations. Market actors have thus an intrinsic
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interest to establish market structures that shield them from competition and
reduce uncertainty. Beckert (2009) highlights mechanisms such as product dif-
ferentiation, first-mover advantages, reciprocal agreements, corruption, cartels,
or monopolies. Such self-regulation of competition can rely on institutional
forms, like standards or voluntary agreements, on networks such as cartels, on
cognitive frames, such as economic theories, or taken-for-granted routine
knowledge.
The third problem, of cooperation among market actors, arises out of a deficit
of knowledge about their exchange partners’ intentions and the quality of the
products. Central to this coordination problem is the notion of trust. While econ-
omists approach the issue by game theoretical considerations, contending that
cooperation is a rational strategy in repeated interactions, economic sociologists
focus on explanations including power relations, social networks, and normative
or cognitive commitment to institutionalized rules as keys to explaining coopera-
tive behaviour (Axelrod 1984; Beckert 2009).
With reference to the above discussed coordination problems, this article will
focus on how values are assigned to art objects and how prices for such objects
are decided among dealers.1 Furthermore, the findings demonstrate how
Japanese antique dealers have developed complex price-making mechanisms to
regulate the competition among themselves over scarce resources. Finally, the
cooperation problem will be addressed by a discussion of the rules about access
to art dealers’ associations and particular auctions and cooperative practices
among dealers in and outside of the auction room. With regards to all three coor-
dination problems, the article will highlight how issues of inclusion/exclusion,
status, reputation, networks and hierarchies impact upon the way in which these
coordination problems are addressed.
After these theoretical considerations, let us shortly turn to the very limited
existing literature on the contemporary Japanese antique art trade. While the
mechanics of purchase and issues of cost are nowadays part of Western art histor-
ical discourses, such issues have so far barely been addressed for Japan (Screech
2007). There are a few academic sources on aspects of the Japanese antique art
trade, but these are largely historical accounts, focusing on the emergence of an
independent art trade following the dissolution of large daimyo collections in the
Meiji period (18681912) and the fate of early important dealers and collectors
(e.g. Guth 1993; Segi and Katsuragi 2003; Kuchiki 2011). Furthermore, there
are numerous books by Segi (e.g. 1987; 1991; 1998) on the market for modern
and contemporary art in Japan, with a particular focus on price developments,
but only one book addresses, albeit very briefly, the role of art dealers’ associa-
tions (Segi 1987). Other relevant sources, to which we will refer shortly in the
findings section, are Segi’s compilations of primary historical materials, such as
art rankings (bijutsu banzuke) (Segi 2000; 2007). Excellent sources for informa-
tion on historical auction prices and historical overviews of Japan’s largest art
dealers associations have been published by the Tokyo and Osaka Art Dealers’
4 Managing (Un)certainty in the Japanese antique art trade
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Associations (Tokyo Bijutsu Kurabu 2006; Osaka Bijutsu Kurabu 2012).
However, even these sources offer almost no material for the investigation of the
issues that are at the heart of this project.
Researching a Japanese market
Besides the above-mentioned limited literature sources, the findings of this article
are primarily based on the analysis of interviews with antique art dealers in Japan.
Arranging these interviews proved more challenging than the author, himself a
long-term antique collector, had originally envisaged. A snowball approach in
identifying informants proved, at least initially, unsuccessful. A few acquainted
dealers were asked for their cooperation in being interviewed and in introducing
other dealers, but while the majority agreed to be interviewed themselves, most
rejected more or less explicitly the idea to help with the arrangement of other
interviews. As it became clearer during the course of the project, and as will be
elaborated on in more detail in the findings section, this was not a sign of unhelp-
fulness but had more to do with a dealer’s status in the implicit dealers’ hierarchy
in Japan. The author was eventually able to gain the cooperation of a few high
status dealers, who proved invaluable in gaining access to others of similar or
lower rank. These dealers’ endorsement of the author as a trustworthy individual
made it possible to interview informants outside the author’s own collecting area
to gain a comprehensive picture of the antique art trade. Between October 2012
and January 2013, the author conducted twenty ‘formal’ one- to two-hour semi-
structured interviews and eleven informal interviews. To ensure validity, a trian-
gulation of data was conducted by raising key issues with multiple interviewees
(Yin 2003). Most of the ‘formal’ interviews were recorded with the prior consent
of the informants. All informants were assured that they would remain
anonymous.2
Japan has five major antique art dealers’ associations, in Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto,
Nagoya and Kanazawa. Even though each of these cities has several hundred
dealers (members and non-members of the art dealers’ associations), the number
of dealers at the higher end of the market is much more limited. Given that most
interviews, except those with dealers at the very top end of the market, were
arranged through other dealers as go-betweens, the author deems it necessary to
withhold here the specializations and even the city locations of the informants in
order to protect their anonymity. All ‘official’ informants are identified by
number.
Given the closed-shop character of this market, the author was unfortunately
only able to briefly attend one dealers-only auction in person (April 2014). How-
ever, he was also able to view some unpublished video material of such auctions,
consult with an art historian who has also observed them in person and was able
to refine and verify his understandings of these practices with several informants
in follow-up interviews in April and June 2014.
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The Japanese antique art trade
Before addressing in detail the specific coordination problems of the market
actors along the theoretical framework presented above, the next section initially
presents an overview of the relevant market structures.
Overview
Definitions of what constitutes an antique object vary. For the purpose of this
project, the author follows a relatively wide Japanese understanding, according
to which antiques comprise ‘old art and objects with a rarity value’ (Sanseido
1993, p. 890). Japanese antique dealers usually consider the Meiji period
(18681912) as a cut off point for the distinction between ‘new art’ (shinbijutsu)
and ‘old art’ (kobijutsu) (Marui 1993, p. 2).
The legal hurdles to becoming an antique dealer in Japan are not particu-
larly high, nor is there much government regulation  with the exception of
the sale of objects that are designated as important cultural property
(Bunkazaihogoho Articles 32, 44). Any Japanese citizen or long-term resident
can apply to the local police station for a trading license in ‘used goods’
(kobutsusho kyokasho) and will  provided that he/she has legal capacity, has
a fixed address and no recent criminal record (Kobutsu Eigyoho Article 4) 
be issued with such a certificate. Kobutsusho kyokasho are needed to deal in
virtually all kinds of ‘used goods’  ranging from old planes to resold art
(Kobutsu Eigyoho Article 2).
There are no systematic data on the number of people dealing in antique art
objects, but there are certainly several thousand countrywide. Every day dozens
of dealers-only auctions (kokankai, literally ‘exchange clubs’) are held some-
where in the country. The minimum requirement to enter such dealers-only auc-
tions is a kobutsusho kyokasho, but access to auctions for goods of higher
commercial value, including antique art objects, will commonly be by application
only and requires that other participating dealers agree in writing to act as joint
guarantors (rentai hoshonin) in case a dealer damages goods or cannot meet his
financial obligations towards the auctioneer or seller. Depending on the quality
level of such auctions, an art dealer needs to find between four to ten joint guar-
antors who need to agree to cover any potential damages (informants 1, 2, 3, 9,
11, 12, 14, 15; Marui 2004).
Inclusion in such auctions thus requires enormous mutual trust among the
participants. Moreover, depending on the auction, other participating dealers
can turn down an application for membership even if sufficient mutual guaran-
tors are willing to support a new dealer. The standing of a sponsoring dealer,
who puts a new dealer’s application forward, is thus of utmost importance. If the
sponsoring dealer has a high status, other dealers are unlikely to challenge such
an application. Some dealers reported that they knew of cases where people had
6 Managing (Un)certainty in the Japanese antique art trade
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gained the cooperation of high status dealers by buying them off (informants 2, 6,
8, 12, 13, 18).
At the apex of this dealers-only auction system are auctions in which only
members of the five largest art dealers’ associations in Tokyo (ca. 500 members),
Osaka (ca. 430 members), Kyoto (ca. 360 members), Nagoya and Kanazawa
(ca. 200 members each) can participate (Marui 2004). Long-established high
status dealers are often members of several or even all five associations.
The art dealers’ associations are organized as cooperatives under the Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprise Cooperatives Act (Chusho Kigyo To Kyodo Kumiai 
Ho). Members are thus only family-owned businesses with fewer than fifty
employees and a capital of 10 million Yen. While a clear categorization is diffi-
cult, the associations’ dealers focus either primarily on post-Meiji period art
(largely excluding contemporary art) or pre-Meiji period art (primarily pre-his-
toric art, Buddhist art, tea ceremony utensils, lacquer ware, Oriental ceramics, as
well as Oriental paintings and calligraphy). It is the latter group with which this
article is primarily concerned, even though a few informants deal with both mod-
ern and antique art objects and four are not members of any of the five dealers’
associations.
While gaining a general trading license (kobutsusho kyokasho) is comparatively
easy for any aspiring antique art dealer, penetrating and gaining status in the
social network of dealers and becoming a member of one of the five major art
dealers’ associations and accessing their auctions is much more difficult.
Although membership is reliant on good personal relationships with and support
from fellow dealers, it is important to note that there are no explicit controls of
membership numbers in the associations. A common route into this network is
through apprenticeships, which are directly arranged between the dealers and the
apprentices and do not involve any external oversight by trade bodies or educa-
tional authorities. The arrangements in terms of compensation and work content
are quite varied and often not even fixed by formal contracts. Several informants
explained that a typical apprenticeship would in the past, up until about the
1950s and 1960s, have lasted at least ten years, while nowadays durations of
three to five years are most common. It is not unusual for apprentices to come
from backgrounds unrelated to the established dealer system, but, especially in
the case of dealerships spanning several generations, apprentices are often the
sons (very few daughters) of fellow dealers in other cities. Dealers from the Kan-
sai region (Osaka and Kyoto) are likely to send their children to Nagoya or Tokyo
and vice versa. These apprentices are often expected to return to and eventually
take over the family business, while ‘outside’ apprentices might aim to establish
their own dealerships (informants 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 20).
Apart from dealers-only auctions, there are also open auctions in which private
individuals can participate. However, if compared with the situation in the West,
open auctions are overall far less important in terms of the value and quantity of
the turned over goods. In this respect, the assessment of London-based Giuseppe
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Eskenazi, one of the world’s leading dealers in oriental art, is enlightening. Com-
menting on the efforts of Christie’s and Sotheby’s, the world’s largest auction
houses, to break into the Japanese market since the 1960s, he explains: ‘All the
auction houses found it very difficult to source items locally in Japan. They were
often politely rebuffed if they attempted to contact the collectors directly; and if
they went to the dealers, they were usually offered rather second-rate goods, as
the trade preferred to keep the best items, either their own goods or their clients’,
to enter into the traditional dealers’ closed auctions’ (Eskenazi and Elias 2012,
p. 79). The situation has not changed considerably in recent years, but a few new
open auction houses, such as Tokyo Chuo Auction (established in 2010), have
entered the scene and now conduct auctions focusing on the currently booming
market for Chinese antiques, where both Chinese dealers and collectors are the
primary customers. Sotheby’s and Christie’s maintain only representative offices
in Tokyo.
Valuations
How do Japanese dealers establish values and prices for the objects of their trade?
Literature in the sociology of arts maintains that aesthetic, artistic, or cultural val-
ues are socially constructed. Even though art historians and collectors might
challenge the narrow view that artworks do not have any intrinsic values, there is
ample evidence that such values are dependent on the social context in which art-
works are produced and consumed (Becker 1984; Zolberg 1990).
Since (antique) art objectives are, like products of the cultural industry and
professional services, by and large ‘singular goods’ (Karpik 2010, p. 10), actors’
value judgements about an object’s quality cannot simply be made with reference
to existing scales of evaluation, as they exist in ‘standard markets’, like gold or
wheat markets. Karpik (2010) has suggested a typology of what he calls judgement
devices that enable market actors to assess quality and thus value in markets for
such ‘singular goods’. He distinguishes five devices: Networks can provide actors
with trustworthy information in markets where the value of a commodity is not
easily measured. Cicerones refer to expert critics and guidebooks that ‘embody a
soft, symbolic form of authority’ (Karpik 2010, p. 46). Especially in art markets,
where objective standards of quality are difficult or even impossible to establish,
quality is constructed by participating actors, such as dealers, museum curators,
art critics, art historians, and collectors. With the term confluences, Karpik refers
to techniques used by firms to channel buyers, such as locational choices, spatial
organization, displays and selling skills. Rankings reduce the complexity of offers
into a single scale, often mimicking objective standards. Finally, appellations
include labels such as designations of origin, certifications, brands, and profes-
sional titles, which are scrutinized by independent third parties. Examples for
such appellations are Roquefort cheese or certified fair trade goods.
8 Managing (Un)certainty in the Japanese antique art trade
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Many of the interviewees found it difficult to explain how they arrive at value
judgements about the objects of their trade. However, piecing together the vari-
ous responses, it appears that all of Karpik’s judgement devices are at work: deal-
ers are influenced by historical value judgements about artists, but are also
actively shaping such judgements through their practices. Rankings of artists and
guidebooks on the perceived qualities of artists have been published in Japan at
least since the Edo period (16031868) (Segi 2000; 2007). For example, Segi
(2007, pp. 2227) discusses a seven-volume Compendium of Appraisals of Painters
of Ancient and Modern Times (Kokon Shoga Kantei Benran) published in 1855.
The implicit rankings of artists in this compendium reflect to a large extent the
current value judgements of dealers of antique paintings. For example, in the
case of Edo-period literati painting, artists such as Yosa Buson (17161784),
Murayama Okyo (17331795) or Ike Taiga (17231776) are typically named
as being most desirable (informants 3, 7, 11, 12, 15, 17).
However, there are also artists such as Ito Jakuchu (17161800) or Soga Sho-
haku (17301781) who have historically received comparatively less attention
and whose appraisal in the dealer’s community increased considerably after the
1980s (informants 3, 7, 12, 15). While it is difficult to disentangle the different
factors that have contributed to this increased interest, it appears that a few dis-
tinguished foreign collectors, museums and art critics, followed by their Japanese
peers, have been active cicerones shaping these new valuations and ultimately the
rankings. Once dealers had realized that these artists’ valuations were on the rise,
they became active purchasers and cooperated in lending their pieces to muse-
ums in a joint effort to enhance the public’s valuation of these artists. Several of
the informants stated that they are actively lending pieces to public art exhibi-
tions as this is likely to raise future sales prices (informants 3, 7, 12, 13, 15, 18).
Appellations play an enormous role in the Japanese antique world, in particular
for objects related to the tea ceremony. The vast majority of the 2.3 million Japa-
nese who are currently reported to engage in the powdered tea (matcha) cere-
mony are members of one of the country’s three largest tea ceremony schools
(Urasenke, Omotesenke, Mushakojisenke). These schools are headed by tea
masters (iemoto) who claim their authority from real and sometimes fictitious
familial relations ranging back to the ‘patron saint’ of the practice, Sen Rikyu
(15221591). When the iemoto system took shape in the late seventeenth cen-
tury, the leading tea masters developed intricate and highly profitable mecha-
nisms to extend their authority over the preparation procedures and the use of
appropriate utensils. By signing the tea objects directly with their cypher signa-
tures (kao) and/or inscribing their accompanying boxes (hakogaki) several gener-
ations of tea connoisseurs  with the iemoto representing the highest authority 
have asserted their aesthetic authority over what are considered to be appropriate
objects and have influenced their production and sale (Surak 2011). Dealers in
antique tea ceremony utensils therefore pay considerable attention to whether
objects are accompanied by appropriate, sometimes multiple, signatures from tea
Harald Conrad 9
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masters and/or collectors to certify their authenticity and to establish exalted
provenance. While the hakogaki of ‘authorities’ and former collectors also play a
role in the paintings trade, the large number of objects of very similar physical
qualities in the tea utensil trade makes such certification there even more impor-
tant. Prices of objects with appropriate certification can easily be several times
more expensive than objects of similar physical qualities lacking such pedigree
(informants 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 16).
Networks are yet another device to assist a dealer in evaluating the quality of an
object. Dealers will commonly purchase items from collectors or at auction (usu-
ally as part of a larger group of works) on which they do not have expert knowl-
edge, since these items fall outside their main area of dealing. They will then seek
the advice of more knowledgeable colleagues, whom they know through their
regular auction interactions, and often sell such objects in a collaborative effort
through their peers (informants 6, 7, 11, 12, 15, 17). This issue will be addressed
in more detail below in a discussion of the collaborative aspects of the trade. Net-
works do not just help to establish value (in the sense of ‘reading’ it from the
object); they can also be used to confer value (in the sense of granting it out of
symbolic power). Having a good connection to an iemoto can mean that one can
easily get a hakogaki which in turn functions as an appellation to establish value
and ultimately influence price.
Finally, confluences appear to be particularly relevant in the tea world, where
important dealers frequently host tea gatherings, which, if attended by an iemoto
or recognized teacher, can elevate the status of the used utensils. Another exam-
ple is art exhibitions hosted by dealers in high-class department stores, so that
the store brand helps to endorse the value of the exhibited art works (Holland
1997).
Pricing
While the valuation of art objects naturally influences the demand for such
pieces, the pricing is far more complex than a micro-economic view of prices
as a result of aggregate demand and supply would suggest. Prices depend on
price mechanisms that are, just like values, socially constructed (Aspers and
Beckert 2011). In a state-of-the-art review of the sociological literature on
pricing, Beckert (2011) distinguishes three dominant approaches. One school
of sociologists has concentrated on the role of networks in pricing mecha-
nisms, focusing on the influence of power relations (e.g. Yakubovich et al.
2005), trust (e.g. Uzzi 1999) and status (e.g. Podolny 1993). Another domi-
nant approach has been to investigate the cultural dimensions of pricing,
such as normative preconditions necessary for goods to become legitimate
objects of market exchange (e.g. Zelizer 1979), preferences (e.g. Smith
1989) and expectations (e.g. Caliskan 2007). Finally, a less dominant group
10 Managing (Un)certainty in the Japanese antique art trade
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of sociologists has focused on the institutional regulation of prices through
direct regulation of competition (e.g. Engels 2006).
The findings of this research project demonstrate the merits of considering the
status and power dimension in an investigation of price making in a market.
Moreover, particular characteristics associated with the marketed assets are
shown to shape these mechanisms. While Japanese dealers sometimes buy
objects directly from customers, the most important way of purchasing is via
dealers-only auctions. Antique art objects are risky investments. While post-Meiji
period painters’ pieces are sometimes sold with reliable authentication certifi-
cates issued by the Tokyo or Osaka art dealers’ associations, most of the objects
of the trade do not carry such certification and there are no institutions that
would perform such authentication (Marui 1993). Depending on the genre and
the historical popularity of artists, there are usually thousands of fake or copied
objects in circulation. While box inscriptions (hakogaki) or documents of tea
masters and former collectors can sometimes help in establishing authenticity,
such inscriptions and documents are also often faked, copied, the result of com-
placent appraisals or simply unreliable since former connoisseurs did not have
access to reliable information. It is therefore not unusual for dealers, even those
with many years of experience, to sometimes buy pieces that, at closer inspection,
turn out to be of a questionable nature. More honest dealers might resell such
pieces at dealers’ auctions, while others will sell them to final customers at more
or less discounted prices. It is also important to note that there is a large grey
zone of objects where proof of authenticity remains elusive and dealers act in
more or less good faith. Moreover, there is a demand from collectors for pieces of
questionable authenticity because these are often, albeit not always, cheaper. A
few dealers, mostly outside of the dealers’ associations, have thus ‘specialized’ to
a certain extent in such objects (informants 2, 5, 6, 9).
The high risk of fakes and a limited supply of high quality material are also
important reasons behind complex pricing mechanisms at dealers’ auctions.
There are basically two types of mechanisms, ascending open-outcry auctions (in
the auction literature referred to as ‘English auctions’; in Japan simply called seri,
‘auctions’) and sealed-bid auctions. Sealed bids are submitted by writing a price
inside a small bowl which is then turned upside down and submitted to the auc-
tioneer. This type of auction is referred to as wanbuse (‘upside down bowl’).
The simplest form of a seri-type auction is similar to an ‘English auction’ in the
sense that the artwork is sold to the highest bidder at a price equal to his or her
final bid. While such simple seri-type auctions have become more frequent in
recent years, and the great bulk of objects are in fact sold in this way, a more com-
plex mechanism, where the seri is combined with lottery drawings (kujibiki) con-
tinues to be used for perhaps about one per cent of all objects. In this system, the
highest bidder initially (otoshinushi) does not automatically ‘win’ the auction but
can be challenged by under-bidders (often only those who have bid above a pre-
defined price limit) into a lottery draw. Let us consider an example to explain the
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mechanism (informant 11): the otoshinushi has made a final successful bid of
10 million Yen, bidding has ended, and the auctioneer is about to proceed to the
next item. Suddenly, 10 under-bidders challenge the right of the otoshinushi to
buy the object for 10 million Yen. They demand a lottery draw to decide who
should be allowed to buy the object at this price. If challenged into such a lottery
draw, the otoshinushi has to comply with the request of the under-bidders, if the
auction does in principle allow such lottery drawings. However, the lottery draw
is not simply conducted to decide who gets to buy the object at 10 million Yen,
but is simultaneously used to decide who gets to be paid a wager for not being
able to buy the object  as a form of compensation for losing the lottery draw.
Before the lottery can take place the otoshinushi has to propose the amount of this
wager. When deciding this amount, he will consider unwritten regional customs,
his potential profit margin after all associated costs, the number of challengers
and his commitment to securing the object. His proposal is made openly and fol-
lowed by all auction participants, who might comment on the appropriateness of
the suggested wager. For example, somebody might shout: ‘Make it higher, why
are you so cheap, the object is going to ‘die’!?’ (informant 9). This shows that the
otoshinushi has to balance his desire to offer a low wager and the peer pressure of
those who realize that the market value of the object is possibly considerably
higher than the winning bid of 10 million Yen. In any case, a total wager sum of
5 to 10 per cent of the highest bid appears to be common. Referring to our exam-
ple, the otoshinushi might thus propose a wager for the lottery draw of 50,000
Yen for each loser. (Note that, unlike in common lotteries, the losers receive a
payment!) In other words, if the otoshinushi loses the lottery, he and the other los-
ing under-bidders will receive 50,000 Yen each from the lottery winner who gains
the right to buy the object for 10 million Yen. However, the otoshinushi, if still
interested in the object, retains in some auctions the right to challenge the winner
of the initial lottery for subsequent draws. In this example, he might suggest a
second draw with the winner of the first draw over a 500,000 Yen wager (the
other under-bidders have no right to take part in the second draw). If the otoshi-
nushi wins this final draw, he needs to pay 8£50,000 D 400,000 Yen to the losers
of the first draw, 500,000 Yen to the loser of the second draw and 10 million Yen
for the object to the seller. If the otoshinushi loses he can either accept 500,000
Yen from the winning party, who also pays off the losers from the first lottery and
buys the piece or, depending on the rules of the particular auction, possibly chal-
lenge the winner for yet another draw of an even higher wager. We discuss the
reasons behind this complex auction mechanism below, but before this we need
to introduce the second type of dealer’s auction.
The wanbuse-type or sealed-bid auction method used in Japanese art dealers’
auctions differs from the first-price or second-price sealed-bid auctions as they
are described in auction literature (Milgram and Weber 1982). In a first-price
sealed-bid auction the highest bidder claims the object paying the bidding price.
In a second-price sealed-bid auction (Vickrey auction) the highest bidder claims
12 Managing (Un)certainty in the Japanese antique art trade
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the object, but pays only the amount of the second highest-bid. While the latter
type of auction might appear to be counter-intuitive from a seller’s perspective,
the economic literature has demonstrated that this arrangement does not neces-
sarily lead to a loss of seller’s revenue. The reason is that bidders in first-price
auctions are often trying to guess what the next-highest bid will be so that they
can bid just a little bit more. They will thus shade their real valuations. Bidders
in second-price auctions, on the other hand, have an incentive to bid their full
reservation values and generally place higher bids than they would in a first-price
auction (Milgrom and Weber 1982; Subramanian 2012). The wanbuse-type auc-
tion, as used in some Japanese antique dealers’ auctions, differs from these types
of auctions as the auctioneer will here, at his full discretion, announce a price
that lies somewhere between the highest and second highest bid. When deciding
this price, the auctioneer will consider what he believes to be a fair market value
of the object, the need to pay the seller a satisfactory price, the need to keep his
bidders happy, the experience of the bidding dealers, and his own commission.
For example, a less experienced dealer, who has put in a bid that is substantially
higher than the second highest bid from a more experienced dealer, might be
lucky to find the auctioneer announcing a price that is closer to the second high-
est bid than to his own bid. This gracious behaviour will only be known to him
and the auctioneer (the second highest bidder and the seller will not know). The
auctioneer could, of course, always maximize the seller’s profit and thus his own
commission, but by ‘taking care’ of a less-experienced dealer in this fashion, he is
likely to have secured a long-term participant for his auction (informant 12).
This example resounds well with Heath’s and Luff’s (2007) findings on the sig-
nificance of social interactions in auction markets and shows that actors are not
simply pursuing short-term profit maximization. If not challenged into a lottery,
the highest bidder in a wanbuse-type auction will pay the announced price and
secure the item. However, just as in the open-outcry auction described above,
the under-bidder(s) can commonly challenge the highest bidder into a lottery
about the right to buy the object. Regardless of the type of auction, the auctioneer
pays the seller after charging a certain percentage of the sales price (which varies,
according to region and auctions, between 4 to 10 per cent) (informants 2, 11,
19, 20).
What are the reasons for these complex auctions-cum-lottery mechanisms?
Fundamentally, from a seller’s perspective, the use of lotteries limits their profit
potential, because bidders have an inherent incentive to shade their real valua-
tions during the auctions in the hope that they can subsequently secure the right
to buy an object through less costly lottery draws. One dealer estimated that bid-
ders go up to around 80 per cent of what they consider to be a fair price in light
of a possible retail value before the lottery system kicks in, but claimed also that
one could not conclude that objects were therefore necessarily always cheaper in
auctions with lotteries (informant 12). Bidders, on the other hand, want to limit
their financial exposure related to the risk of buying artworks of questionable
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quality. Given the closed-shop character of Japanese dealers’ auctions and a lack
of alternative avenues for sales of higher quality antique art in Japan, it is proba-
bly fair to conclude that sellers have historically been somewhat disadvantaged.
However, dealers are ultimately reliant on the supply of quality material and
have therefore started to make concessions to sellers’ requests, over the last ten
to fifteen years, to reign in the use of lotteries (informants 3, 6, 9, 11, 12, 17, 19,
20). While lottery draws used to be very common at all types of auctions in the
past, the Tokyo, and subsequently the Osaka, art dealers’ associations have in
recent years limited the use of lotteries in their auctions to objects of a minimum
value of 2 million Yen. Moreover, they allow now only one round of lottery draws
instead of the multiple rounds that were prevalent in the past (informants 1, 3, 7,
9, 11, 15). It is, however, important to note that these associations’ auctions
make up only a small percentage of the auctions that many dealers, regardless of
their status, will visit and that lotteries continue to be widespread in these other
auctions. Moreover, at the auctions of the Kyoto art dealers’ association, lotteries
continue to play an important role (informants 5, 6, 8, 9, 11). One consequence
of this is that certain material is now more likely to be sold in Osaka or Tokyo,
since it is likely to fetch higher prices there, and that the overall volume and qual-
ity of objects in Kyoto has been declining (informants 3, 7, 10, 11, 14). Never-
theless, dealers participating in the Kyoto auctions, which handle predominately
tea wares, are adamant that the lottery system should continue (informants 6,
12, 16). In fact, while some dealers question the need for lotteries as part of the
price making process (informants 5, 11), most informants, across all genres and
regardless of their locations, consider it to be an important practice. What
explains this attitude?
The dealers do generally not believe that objects should always go to those
members of the trade who have the deepest pockets. Instead, given a limited
amount of quality material, they consider it important that prices and allocations
are moderated so that all members of the dealers’ community have a fair chance
of making a living. This means that everybody should be able to buy higher qual-
ity objects in their area of specialization and that those not prevailing should be
able to recover at least some of their participation costs, e.g. travel costs (inform-
ants 3, 4, 9, 12). As one dealer, who is incidentally also an organizer of a dealers-
only auction with lotteries, put it succinctly, ‘the lottery system secures equality’
(informant 12). While the lottery system has been used since the Meiji period
(Osaka Bijutsu Kurabu 2012), one dealer noted that it had been strengthened in
the 1960s and 1970s in response to one particular dealer, who was frequently
able to outbid his peers (informant 5). However, it is important to stress that
only perhaps about one per cent of objects are sold using lottery drawings and
that they are mostly used for middle level objects. The reason seems to be that
cheaper goods offer few potential benefits in terms of compensation through the
wagers, while the most expensive objects are beyond the means of most dealers,
who are thus unable to contest the high offers of the wealthiest traders.
14 Managing (Un)certainty in the Japanese antique art trade
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In sum, while the auction-cum-lottery system is likely to suppress prices of
some material to the advantage of the buying dealers, it enables the management
of competition over scarce resources, which are additionally associated with a
high risk of fakes. However, one should not reduce the analysis of the auction-
cum-lottery system simply to these economic aspects, which are linked to the
specific challenges of the antique trade. Several informants also pointed to the
playful social aspects of the different types of auctions and lotteries (informants
9, 11, 12, 18, 20). One dealer considered the lottery system an expression of
Japan’s ‘play culture’ (asobi no bunka) (informant 12).
Moreover, status and power-relations clearly have an impact on price mak-
ing. Status in the dealers’ world can either be ascribed status, which is most
commonly gained through kinship ties that place somebody in a famous,
long-established shop, or achieved status. Even though the informants had
rather vague ideas about what constituted status in the dealers’ world, it
appears to be primarily a function of membership in the dealers’ associations,
expert knowledge, the perceived quality of a dealer’s wares, financial success
and access to rich clientele. The way status plays out in auction room inter-
actions was nicely illustrated by some lower status dealers. They complained
that, regardless of their ability and willingness to pay a specific price, they
found it at times difficult to challenge higher status dealers (primarily those
with an ascribed status) for a lottery draw, while the latter might at times
use their status power to demand multiple lottery draws to secure a desired
object (informants 2, 5, 12, 17, 20).
Competition
The above discussion of the auction-cum-lottery mechanisms has demonstrated
how dealers manage the competition over scarce resources through their price
making arrangements. However, competition in the market is also directly regu-
lated by the (unwritten) rules about the use of information and the access to the
dealers’ network.
As explained above, a common way of entry into the dealers’ network is
through an apprenticeship. There are commonly no written agreements about
how a former apprentice can use information gained during his tenure. However,
this does not mean that a new dealer can simply access clients known to him
from his time as an apprentice. Even though some dealers are known not to
object to a former apprentice’s use of such information, a number of informants
related stories about how their former employer had to ‘approve’ sales to old cus-
tomers or how they were restricted in sending sales catalogues to such clients
after they had opened their own shops (informants 4, 11, 18, 19, 20). One infor-
mant explained how an acquaintance had already purchased and started to
rebuild a property to open his own dealership, when the intervention of his
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former boss brought everything to a sudden halt (informant 1). Even though a
former employer has little legal means to restrict any such activities, the informal
power of a long-established dealership is considerable.
The business opportunities of a former apprentice are severely restricted if
his employer discredits him among fellow dealers. Moreover, simply not sup-
porting a former apprentice can have serious consequences, as the following
example demonstrates: in order to become a member of the art dealers’ asso-
ciations one has to fulfil a number of criteria. First, a dealer is supposed to
have maintained his own business premises for at least ten years. However,
this requirement is often waived if one has worked for many years at a high
status dealer (informants 7, 10, 12). Secondly, the former employer needs to
issue a letter of recommendation to the art dealers’ association at the location
where the dealer maintains his business. One informant, who had worked in a
responsible position in a highly reputable dealership, related his difficulties in
convincing his former employer to issue such a statement, even though they
had parted on good terms. This difficulty prevented the dealer from becoming
a member of any of the big five art dealers’ associations for more than fifteen
years, as one has to first enter the association at one’s place of business,
before one can then potentially enter any of the other four major establish-
ments. Only after a number of befriended dealers exerted moral pressure on
his behalf was he finally able to receive a letter of approval and enter several
associations (informant 11).
As in other markets, Japanese antique dealers seek to insulate themselves from
competition by some form of product differentiation, which means that they will
frequently concentrate either on a particular genre and/or material of a certain
price level. This is especially important when other dealers have their shops in
close physical proximity. Although the geographical location of art dealerships in
the five cities is quite disperse, there are historically a number of shop clusters,
such as the Kyobashi and Roppongi districts in Tokyo, the Kitahama and Korai-
bashi districts in Osaka, and the Shimonzen/Furumonzen and Teramachi dis-
tricts in Kyoto.
The issue of product differentiation is related to how dealers protect their
self-claimed domains by what they spoke of as face (mentsu) saving acts. A
number of informants related experiences during auctions in which they felt
that they had to assert their ‘ownership’ of a particular genre or domain by
bidding on objects in which they were not particularly interested so that other
dealers could not get their hands on them. This behaviour does not only pre-
vent other dealers from offering material to one’s own clients, but also signals
to the sellers’ community that one is actively buying a particular genre. The
sellers will thus be encouraged to actively seek and bring such material to
future auctions and one is then also often in a moral bind (giri) to buy their
objects, even if they might not always meet one’s quality standards (inform-
ants 6, 11, 12, 16, 20).
16 Managing (Un)certainty in the Japanese antique art trade
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Cooperation
Given the important role of network ties to secure membership in the art dealers’
associations, it is not surprising that those inside these networks show strong com-
mitment to the rules of the market. Even though some informants had experi-
enced hardships related to uncooperative former employers in setting up their
own dealerships, none of them seriously questioned the rationale of the closed
and implicitly hierarchical system, which shields them ultimately from more com-
petition and gives them access to auctions with objects of the best available qual-
ity. This finding resounds with Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) assertion that the
stability of hierarchies depends on the reward for compliance with the hierarchical
order. Moreover, the strong network ties allow different forms of cooperation.
One aspect of cooperation is bid-rigging (dango) in auctions. Even if there are
numerous dealers in an auction, depending on the nature of an object, the poten-
tial number of interested dealers can be small. Since these dealers have a mutual
understanding of each other’s interests, they might agree in advance to limit their
competition in an upcoming auction. One dealer will be designated to buy the
piece and the subsequent profit from selling it to a customer is shared among the
members of the bid-rigging consortium (informants 5, 6, 11). Bid-rigging can
also mean that a group of dealers agrees to bid up the price of an object that is
sold by one of the members of the consortium in return for an agreed percentage
of the final sales price (informants 2, 5, 6).
Yet another form of cooperation is the pooling of resources to buy objects that are
beyond the means of a single dealer. Just as in the case of bid-rigging, the participat-
ing dealers will agree in advance on their respective profit shares from a subsequent
sale by the dealer with the most promising client base (informants 5, 6, 11).
Finally, cooperation among dealers can be important to protect objects from
losing their ‘innocence’ or ‘virginity’ (ubu). Dealers often describe an object as
having an ubu quality. This can mean several things, not least because there is no
precise definition and dealers use the term differently: first, it can relate to the
physical aspects of an object, usually meaning that it is in its ‘original’ condition
and has never been remounted (in the case of painting or calligraphy scrolls),
repaired or otherwise intentionally altered. However, some dealers might use ubu
to simply refer to an old mounting, old box or nice patina. Secondly, it can relate
to the fact that an object is new to the market, usually because it has not been
offered for sale for many years. Objects that combine these two aspects are most
desirable and fetch the highest prices, because collectors always like to be shown
‘new’ material, ideally with nice patina and exalted provenance (informants 1, 2,
5, 11, 17, 19, 20). Cooperation among dealers can protect objects from losing
their ‘innocence’ too quickly. For example, an object that has been published in
a widely circulated dealer’s catalogue but fails to sell might subsequently be diffi-
cult to trade, because buyers  dealers and collectors  rightly or wrongly,
assume that there must be something ‘wrong’ with it. To prevent this from
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happening, dealers collaborate at times across cities and exchange objects
between themselves to show them to different clienteles that are also unlikely to
visit the other dealership. In this way, the objects remain ‘fresh’ to the market
and retain a higher price potential (informants 2, 4, 6, 13, 17).
Conclusion
This article has sought to shed light on the hitherto understudied Japanese
antique art trade. Informed by recent theoretical contributions by Beckert and
Aspers (Beckert 2009; Beckert 2011; Aspers and Beckert 2011) we have focused
on three distinct coordination problems that Japanese antique art dealers have to
confront: valuation, competition and cooperation. While our discussion of the find-
ings has detailed several economic aspects of these coordination problems, it has
also demonstrated how issues of inclusion/exclusion, status, reputation, networks
and hierarchy play an enormous role in creating the social order of this particular
Japanese market and how these issues impact on the way these coordination
problems are addressed.
To start with, in terms of the valuation problem, the findings highlight the
importance of distinguishing between notions of value and price in our under-
standing of markets. Both value judgements and prices are demonstrated to be
socially constructed, but the underlying mechanisms are different. Value judge-
ments are made via networks, cicerones, confluences, rankings, and appellations.
While value judgements influence demand and supply conditions, price making
does not simply reflect these conditions. Instead, prices are the result of complex
price making mechanisms which the actors have shaped to address particular
market challenges, but they are also influenced by status and power as they are
socially constructed through the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion in the
art dealers’ associations. While economists focus primarily on the price-maximiz-
ing function of auctions, our findings highlight that auctions can also function as
price moderating and allocative mechanisms influenced by the social order of the
participants. These findings are in line with what Smith (1989) has found for US
American commodity auctions, where both prices and allocations are also
actively managed and influenced by status hierarchies. In terms of the competi-
tion problem, the article has underscored the important function of the art deal-
ers’ associations in channelling scarce resources to a limited membership. The
five major art dealers’ associations are at the apex of a hierarchal trading system
where inclusion is strongly dependent on reputational and network resources. As
organizers of the most important dealers’-only auctions, with their intricate price
making mechanisms, the dealers’ associations manage, and to a certain extent
limit, competition over resources. Finally, in terms of the cooperation problem,
the article has shown how the strong network ties, which shape and are shaped
by the dealers associations, allow dealers to engage in cooperative practices such
18 Managing (Un)certainty in the Japanese antique art trade
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as bid-rigging and strategic placement of art objects to protect their ‘innocence’
(ubu).
Let us finally consider how the findings of this project compare with those
on other Japanese markets. Gerlach and Lincoln (1998) point out that
Japan’s social order has commonly been described as being characterized by
strong personal, obligatory, and diffuse relations, while ‘legal-rational’ insti-
tutions of competitive markets or court-ordered contracts are less common
and consequential than in the West. Vertically-ordered interpersonal bonds,
in-group cohesion and out-group separation have been common themes of
social structure research (e.g. Nakane 1970). Research on Japanese industrial
structures has identified strong networks both within (co-worker ties) and
among (long-term supplier relationships with relational contracting, cross-
shareholdings, dispatched directors) large firms (Dore 1973; Lincoln and
Gerlach 2004). Similar findings have been generated by Bestor’s (1998;
2004) work on the social organization of Tsukiji’s fish market, which is
largely dominated by small-scale businesses.
The findings of this project confirm the importance of strong personal ties and
the network character of Japanese business organization, but appear to resonate
particularly well with Bestor’s findings. Even though the fish market differs in
terms of the strong influence of government regulation on the market structure,
which is insignificant in the case of the antique trade, both markets share signifi-
cant similarities in terms of the dominance of family firms, varying and complex
auction mechanisms, exclusivity of auction participation, the role of trade guilds
and licensing, kinship ties, and mini-cartels. In both cases, the complex rules of
the marketplace are essentially aimed at preserving all members’ relative eco-
nomic positions and their access to resources. As Bestor (1998, p. 179) points
out, Nakane’s (1970) societal model of vertical social integration neglects some-
what the strong ‘horizontal linkages among relative equals’ as they join together
around mutual common interests, both in the organization of the fish market and
the antique art trade.
In sum, this article confirms the findings of other researchers who have
highlighted the strong network character of some Japanese markets and
shows how important it is to consider both hierarchical and horizontal ties
among market actors. Having said this, every market has its own rules and
there might well be other Japanese markets where such linkages play a lesser
role or where technological developments render them obsolete. This is the
stuff for future research.
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Notes
1. Price making towards customers could not be investigated as dealers are understandably reluc-
tant to disclose such information.
2. Research for this project was conducted only with dealers from the cities with the largest associ-
ations, namely Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto, but the data suggest that the findings apply equally to
practices in Nagoya and Kanazawa.
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